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Abstract 
Frequently, a narrative leaves room for different interpretations. Perspectival ambiguities, in 
particular, may lead to different interpretations of narrative discourse. In this paper, it is argued 
that the analysis of perspectival mbiguities can be grounded in a cognitive-linguistic approach to 
mental space representations orembedded domains. In such cases, readers may arrive at different 
possible domain structures as a representation of the narrative. This model is exemplified by the 
study of the biblical story Solomon's Judgment. The domain structure analysis offers explanations 
for different ways in which translators and readers represent ambiguities in this story. Eleven 
translations were compared. In a pilot experiment, students of Tilburg University were randomly 
assigned to an idiolect translation group (N= 20), or a dynamic-equivalent translation group 
(N = 20). Differences in the students' representation of the story were found. The implications of 
these findings are discussed and re-examined by means of a second experiment. 
1. Introduction 
Perspective taking is an indispensable part of narrative processing. In the representa- 
tion of a narrative discourse, readers create situational or spatial models of objects and 
characters located in space, with characters performing actions that evolve over time 
(Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) and inferring causal connections that relate characters' 
actions to their goals (Bower and Morrow, 1990). Readers ' view' these situations from a 
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perspective point, that is, a here-and-now point which is often associated with the 
narrative protagonist (Morrow, 1994; Sanders and Spooren, forthcoming). Readers of 
narrative discourse will also incorporate characters' perspectives in the mental represen- 
tation (Millis, 1995); such perspectives are established in narrative discourse when the 
perception of the narrative situation is presented from the point of view of (one of) the 
narrative's protagonists (characters). 
The realization of a character's perspective involves the representation f a character's 
spoken and mental discourse in direct, indirect, or free indirect form (Leech and Short, 
1981), as well as more implicit types of perspective, which represent a character's 
mental states and perceptions (Sanders and Redeker, 1993: 70-73; Sanders and Redeker, 
in press). Dixon and Bortolussi (1995) found that perspective choices (direct versus free 
indirect speech) influence the situation model that readers represent and lead to different 
attributions of attitudes and beliefs to narrator and characters. However, in his study of 
ambiguous narratives, Keysar (1994) found that readers also used perspective-irrelevant 
information i  the attribution of perceptions and attitudes by characters in the discourse 
(illusory transparency of intention). 
In this paper, an efficient method of studying the representation f perspective is
proposed within the broader framework of discourse representation, as offered by 
cognitive linguistic theories of discourse domains, mental spaces, or partitioned repre- 
sentations (Seuren, 1985; Fauconnier, 1985; Dinsmore, 1991; and others). The cognitive 
linguistic approach places perspective in a general framework of related linguistic 
features uch as presupposition, metaphor, and modality. Furthermore, the analysis of 
discourse perspective in terms of domains offers a structure to represent readers' 
inferred attributions of emotions and intentions to narrative protagonists, which they 
make in order to produce a coherent discourse representation f a narrative. Finally, the 
construction of a domain representation f discourse perspective uncovers and explains 
ambiguities in perspectives and in the inferred attribution of intentions. 
2. A cognitive-linguistic approach to perspective in narrative discourse 
In Sanders and Redeker (1993), the notion of discourse perspective was modeled in a 
cognitive linguistic framework which was based on Fauconnier's (1985) Mental Spaces 
Theory. In the case of perspective, a mental space or domain is built that is bound to a 
person in the (narrative) discourse. The perspectivized information may be this person's 
purported utterance, thought, dream, opinion, perception, etc. Given these considera- 
tions, perspective xpresses the attribution of the validity claim of some units of 
information to a particular person in the narrative. In other words, a narrative segment is
perspectivized if its relevant context of interpretation is a person-bound, embedded 
domain within the narrator's reality (Sanders and Redeker, 1993: 69). Sentence (lb) is 
an example of an embedded perspective which is attributed to the subject of sentence 
(1 a), Solomon. 
(1) (a) Solomon was biting his nails. (b) Oh, this was such a difficult decision to make! 
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What distinguishes (lb) from purely narrated escriptions of situations and events 
such as (la) is that some of the narrator's responsibility for the content of sentence (lb) 
is delegated to a person in the text (in this case 'Solomon' in (la)), whose speech, 
thought, perception, emotion, or intention is represented. The material within a perspec- 
tive domain such as (lb) is interpreted as valid or factual to the person to whom the 
domain is bound, while only possibly valid outside this domain in the narrator's 
reality. In this definition of perspective, the narrator's reality is whatever is presented as 
real in the narrative world, regardless of its truth or validity outside of the narrative. This 
experiencing person (henceforth: character) can be any narrative protagonist other than 
the narrator in the here-and-now, and can, thus, include the distanced first-person 
narrator in the past, in dreams, and so forth. 
The narrator's reality reflects not only the narrator's knowledge but also that of the 
reader. In the analysis, this narrative reality is segmented and represented in terms of 
perspective domain structures. Domain (mental space) structures are the presumed 
products of discourse interpretation; each new discourse fragment can cause changes or 
updating in already established domain structures through the addition of new informa- 
tion. The reader can thus shift from domain to domain in order to compare, connect, and 
disconnect the information from different domains (Fauconnier, 1994). 
The segmentation f narrative reality into domains makes it possible to distinguish 
between information in the basic narrative reality that narrator, characters and readers 
share, and perspectivized information, for which a particular character is responsible. In
representing these perspective domains, the analysis will reveal places in which a 
narrative discourse leaves room for different interpretations. In such cases, readers may 
arrive at different perspective domain structures as representation f the narrative, both 
during the interpretation process and as an ultimate result of the interpretation. Thus, 
they may differ as to whom (narrator, characters) they regard as responsible for which 
information. The attribution of inferred intentions to characters can also be adequately 
represented in the analytical framework of domains. In the following section, the 
consequences of these insights will become clear in a study of a narrative from the 
Hebrew Bible. 
The Hebrew Bible provides excellent narrative material for demonstrating the con- 
struction of perspective domains and the inference of attributions. Biblical narrators are 
non-intrusive, in that they seldom reveal their characters' emotions and intentions, while 
the speech and acts by characters are represented in a direct and clear fashion. In a 
corpus of six narrative pisodes (Genesis 3; Genesis 25: 19-34; Exodus 1: 1-2: 10; II 
Samuel 10-11; I Kings 3: 16-28; and Ruth 3, in total 810 clauses) 2 it was found that 
the majority (59.1%) of all clauses were direct speech clauses; indirect speech and 
thought were practically absent (0.4%). Most of the remaining clauses (33.1%) were 
directly narrative, reporting acts and situations, while only a small part of all clauses 
(5.4%) showed implicit perspectivization by the narrator as to characters' perceptions 
2 In the corpus analysis, the Dutch translation of the Nederlands Bijbeigenootschap (NBG 1951) was used. 
This is a literal (idiolec0 translation, in which each word and each syntactic onstruction is preserved as much 
as possible (see section 3). 
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and emot ions  (see Sanders  and Redeker ,  1993). The  story o f  So lomon 's  Judgment  (I 
K ings  3: 16 -28)  is a conc ise  example  o f  a complete  narrat ive  f rom this corpus.  
3. Perspective domain structure of 'Solomon's Judgment' 
The story o f  Solomon's Judgment is used  in a l i teral  t rans lat ion f rom the or ig inal  
Hebrew text. In the text, the ind icators  in ital ics s ignal  where  an embedded perspect ive  
domain  is opened or  c losed;  the l inguist ic  s ignal  wh ich  opens  the domain  is pr in ted  in 
bo ld  pr int.  
(2) 
Context: Solomon is king of Israel. In the previous context (chapters 1-2) it is related how the king enforces 
his reign by killing rivals and former allies, who had previously betrayed him. After this he has a dream in 
which he asks JHWH God for great wisdom and has his wish granted (1 Kings 3: 1-15). 
16. Two women, harlots, came to the king 
and stood before him. 
17. And the one woman said, 
[domain 1:0 my Lord, I and this woman dwell in one house; 
and I was delivered of a child with her in the house. 
18. And it happened on the third day after I was delivered 
that this woman was delivered also; 
and we were alone; 
there was no stranger with us in the house, 
just we two were in the house. 
19. And this woman's child died in the night, 
because she lay on it. 
20. And she arose in the night, 
and took my son from my side, 
while your maidservant slept, 
and laid him in her bosom, 
and laid her dead son in my bosom. 
21. And I arose in the morning to nurse my son, 
[domain 1.a: and see, he was dead]: 
and I looked at him closely in the morning, 
[domain l.b: and see, it was not the son I had borne].] 
22. And the other woman said, 
[domain 2: No, my son is the living, 
and your son is the dead]. 
And this one said, 
[domain 1: No, your son is the dead, 
and my son is the living]. 
Thus they spoke before the king. 
23. And the king said, 
[domain 3: The one says, 
[domain 3.a: This is my son, the living one, 
and your son is the dead one]: 
and the other says, 
[domain 3.b: No, your son is the dead one, 
and my son is the living one].] 
J. Sanders/Poetics 24(1996) 57-80 61 
24. And the king said, 
[domain 3: Bring me a sword.] 
And they brought a sword before the king. 
25. And the king said, 
[domain 3: Cut the living child in two, 
and give half to the one, 
and half to the other.] 
26. And the woman whose son was the living one said to the king 
[domain 4: truly her bowels had grown warm because of her son], 
and she said, 
[domain 4:0 my Lord, give her the living child, 
and in no wise kill it]. 
And this one said, 
[domain 5: Neither mine nor yours it will be, 
cull 
27. And the king answered 
and said, 
[domain 3: Give her the living child, 
and in no wise kill it: 
she is its mother.] 
28. And all Israelites heard of the judgment 
that the king had given; 
they stood in awe of the king. 
Truly they saw 
[domain 6: that he wisdom of God was in him to do judgment.] 
Analysis of this text reveals three aspects of its perspective domain representation: 
- the construction of perspective domains; 
- the inference of attributions that are represented within the domain structure in order 
to arrive at a coherent text; 
- the uncovering of ambiguous places in the perspective domain structure (three cases: 
A, B, and C). 
In the first sentence of the story, v.16, three characters are introduced: two women, 
who are not distinguished from each other, and a king. One of the two women - it is not 
made clear who she is, so we will call her woman 1 - speaks. The word 'said' opens a 
perspective domain that is attributed to the speaking woman in the story. In Fig. 1, this 
attribution is represented by the arrow between woman 1, 'said', and embedded speech 
domain 1. Within the embedded speech domain, the information that must be attributed 
to the speaking woman 1 is represented. The woman claims that she is the mother of the 
living of two infants, the other one of which is dead. 
Within this embedded perspective domain (1), there are two pieces of information 
that contradict each other. Speaking about her son, woman 1 says in v.21 and see, he 
was dead and two clauses later and see, it was not the son I had borne. The statements 
in these subclauses cannot both be true, which implies that at least one of them must be 
represented in a separate, more deeply embedded omain. Indeed, both statements 
contain a domain indicator "and see', which is a translation of the particle 'wehinneh ' in 
the original text. This element is commonly used to introduce a character's perception, 
an invitation to the listener/reader to imagine what follows as seen through a particular 
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nar ra tor ' s  
reality 
2 women 
king 
Ss~'d ~Ib~ $1}m=h 
woman I ~ ia l f l  J 
woman 2 
said 
2 oe, m0,0er0f = o,) / 
~ domain  bu i lder  
Fig. 1. Perspective domain representation f v.16-22 
character's eyes (Schneider, 1993: 268; Berlin, 1983: 62). This construction results in 
two doubly embedded omains (1.a) and (1.b) which represent two different viewpoints 
which the woman had at different moments of perception, the latter perception correct- 
ing the first; the linguistic form is comparable to the modem representation type of the 
free indirect mode (see also Steinberg, 1985). 
In v.22, one of the two women - the other one, so we will call her woman 2 - 
speaks. Again, a domain is opened with the word 'said'; this domain must be attributed 
to woman 2. This woman also claims that she is the mother of the living of the two 
infants. The information in this fragment (v.16-22) is represented in Fig. 1. 
In v.23, the king verbally repeats parts of what the women said. In order to 
understand this repetition as a meaningful part of the story, readers will have to draw 
inferences as to the king's intentions. In general, the narrator's and protagonists' 
intentions, which cause their behavior, must be inferred in addition to the perspectival 
attributions as to who is said to say or think what. The preconceptions governing such 
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causal inferences and likelihood assessments may best be regarded as a schema or 
'script' in which a succession of 'scenes' (acts and events) axe linked in a single 
coherent structure (Nisbett and Ross, 1980: 30; Schank and Abelson, 1977); such scripts 
will be evoked by particular words or situations. The inferences that are based on scripts 
are presumably added to the mental domain structures that readers produce in order to 
achieve a coherent representation f the narrative discourse. 
At the beginning of this story, the women's representations of the fatal event are 
different. The (implicit) accusation that the other is telling lies is part of a cognitive 
frame of judging (Fillmore, 1982). This, combined with the fact that the women present 
the king with their contraditory stories, may activate a script of jurisdiction in the 
memory of readers. In other words: on the basis of world knowledge, one may assume 
that the women brought heir conflict to the king for a particular reason, i.e., to decide 
who is right and who is wrong. Thus the king, in his role as judge, is confronted with a 
problem, and the reader, with him, is confronted with a riddle (see Lasine, 1989): Who 
should get the child? This can explain why the king repeats the women's tatements: he 
is pondering the problematic situation, either by himself or in communication with the 
two women. In the domain structure representations, such inferred attributions are 
indicated in brackets, which are connected to the characters they are attributed to. 
A. Inner or spoken perspective by the king? 
The king's speech act could be interpreted as communicative speech, but, more likely 
in the present context of judgment, as the king's thoughts. Such non-communicative 
"speech", called collective monologue, is not uncommon in biblical narrative as a 
method of representing inner thoughts of characters (Niehoff, 1992). 
Even if the king's words are interpreted as his private thoughts, they do not provide a 
clue to his intentions, which are represented by a question mark in Fig. 2. Readers may 
know the previous biblical context in which the king has been ruthless before (for 
instance, 1 Kings 2: 42-46: Solomon orders the death of his enemies). On the other 
hand, the episode directly preceding the present episode (1 Kings 3: 5-15: JHWH 
promised Solomon great wisdom, see Parker, 1992) and the jurisdiction script may guide 
readers to expect a clever question or a wise decision by the king, rather than his 
surprisingly cruel demand: Cut the living child in two. In the representation f this 
fragment, both 'wise' and 'cruel' must be inferred as possible contradictory intentions 
attributed to the king. The inferred relations are pictured as dotted lines in Fig. 2. 
The king's demand may not reveal a clear goal or reason, hut it does have a clear 
effect: it forces a break-through in the situation. The women's interest is no longer 
central; the mother of the living child puts the child's interest before her own. Note that 
v.26 is the only instance of explicitly internal perspectivization in the narrative, that is, 
the maternal feelings ('her bowels had grown warm') of the real mother. Thus, the 
reader is directly informed that the woman who would rather give the child up is the 
mother. In this verse, the second ambiguity arises. 
B. Who is the real mother of the living child, the first or the second woman to speak? 
Curiously, it is not made clear which of the two women is the real mother, woman 1 
or woman 2. In Fig. 3, this position is represented by indicating the women by using 
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= domain  bu i lder  
...... -~  = in fe rence  
Fig. 2. Perspective domain representation f v.23-25 
new labels, woman a and woman b. Contrary to the narrator and reader, the king does 
see who speaks when, but he is not informed who the mother is: he infers it from the 
women's reactions to his demand. In the representation, therefore, relations of conse- 
quence must be added as the king's conclusions between the embedded omains and the 
narrator's reality. These relations are represented in Fig. 3 by dotted lines between the 
women's embedded domains and the king's attributed conclusions in the narrator's 
reality. 
The question arises whether it is possible and necessary to disambiguate the reference 
between woman 1 and woman 2, and woman a and woman b. If a law of economy is 
presumed to be operating in the representation of narrative, readers will solve such 
ambiguities if a relevant and obviously unambiguous interpretation is available. In the 
case of ambiguity between characters, readers may be guided towards identification with 
one character ather than with the other, thus disambiguating in favour of this character. 
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nar ra tor ' s  
rea l  i ty  
/ \ 
' .......... \ 
I consequently _ / 
\ ,ff  / 
woman b ~ ~  / cut " t 
65 
= domain builder 
........ ~, = inference 
Fig. 3. Perspective domain representation of v.26 
In this case, however, decisive cues that might guide readers' identification with 
characters are not provided: 
- neither woman is referred to by a proper name (Sanford et al., 1988); 
- neither woman is more important o the plot as a thematic character than the other 
(Morrow, 1985); 
- there is no difference between gender or the social position of the two women, with 
one appealing more to the readers' own perspective than the other (Pichert and 
Anderson, 1977, among others); 
- woman 1 speaks first and most elaborately about the crucial episode, which might 
define her as main character of the story (see, for instance, Bower, 1978: 227), thus 
leading readers to interpret her version, by default, as true, and woman 2's short 
denial as false (in terms of the domain structure, woman a would be woman 1 and 
woman b would be woman 2 in Fig. 3). However, one may also interpret woman 1 's 
lengthy statement as unverified and unverifiable. 
In fact, it is undecidable which of the two is woman a, the one who has these 
maternal feelings. This ambiguity places the reader in a similar position as the king, and 
is thus part of the story's plot. In his reconstruction of the king's inferences, the reader 
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Fig. 4. Updated perspective domain representation of v.24-25 
will be convinced of the king's wisdom as it is materialized in v.27: the child can be 
given to its mother. 
Yet, it is not clear exactly where the king's wisdom originates. The classical 
interpretation is that the king deliberately gives a fake cruel judgement to provoke the 
real mother's (woman a) predictable reaction. In this case, readers have to go back in 
their domain structure to update their representation of v.24-25 by attributing an 
inferred intention to the king, which overrules the original uncertain and abstract 
attributions of wisdom versus cruelty, as represented in Fig. 4. 
Interestingly, attention has recently been focussed on an alternative interpretation i  
which it is the king's willingness to change his cruel mind as a reaction to the real 
mother's plea that is his real wisdom (Van Wolde, 1995; see also Van Heijst, 1994). In 
this case, the expectation of a wise decision in the representation f v.24-25 is replaced 
by the attribution of indifference and cruelty to the king, which in v.26 is changed into 
wisdom as a result of the mother's plea. This shift of opinion is required in order to 
explain the king's second ecision, that is, to spare the child's life, as represented in Fig. 
5. The third ambiguity arises in this same verse (v.27): 
C. Who gets the child, the mother who wants the child to live or the woman who wants 
the child to die? 
It is not clear from his command to whom the king gives the child, the woman who 
spoke to save the child, 'give it to her' (woman a) or the woman who spoke last, "cut' 
(woman b). 3 In Fig. 5, this position is represented by denoting the woman who gets the 
child as woman #. 
3 At this point, the Hebrew original does not give an explication. 
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Fig. 5. Perspective domain representation of v.26-27 
The function of this ambiguity could be (as it is in B) to make the reader decide, as 
did the king, who deserves to be the mother. However, this case is less clear and more 
disturbing: if one presumes 'her' to refer to the nearest referent (Clark and Sengul, 
1979), it is the latter woman b who gets the child. This would suggest that the woman 
who would rather have the child die than give it up, deserved to get the child; this point 
of view is defended by some analists (see Lasine, 1989). On the basis of world 
knowledge about what is good and fair, it seems unlikely that the narrator would support 
such a viewpoint. Rather the king would indeed give the living child to the other 
woman, who wants to save it, simply because she had the better intentions. Another way 
of solving this ambiguity is offered by the illusory transparency of intention (Keysar, 
1994) which could be working here. The fact that readers have privileged information 
about woman a's motherly intentions may lead them to believe the king likewise 
perceives this intention and thus gives the child to this woman. 
Either way, it makes sense to attribute to the king the wisdom to decide who is the 
mother and to give the living child to the mother. In this interpretation, woman # would 
be woman a in Fig. 5. In v.28, the story is concluded with the confirmation of the king's 
wisdom by the people of Israel, thus enforcing the story's rhetorical goal. This 
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conclusion presupposes the interpretation that woman a, who is the living child's 
mother, gets the child. The story would in fact be difficult to understand if the king did 
not give the child to its real mother, woman a. 
4. Representation of ambiguous perspective in translations 
In the reconstruction f discourse domains in the story of Solomon's Judgment, three 
ambiguities were found, each different in nature. 
A (v.23) is ambiguous as to the type of perspective (spoken or thought); the choice is 
dependent on readers' inferences as to the quality of the situation at hand. 
B (v.26) is ambiguous as to the attribution of perspective: to whom should the 
utterances 'give the child to her' and "cut' be attributed. This choice cannot be made on 
the basis of the information in the story itself. Rhetorically, this ambiguity is relevant 
because it contributes to the effect of the king's wise decision. 
C (v.27) is ambiguous as to the reference within a perspective: to whom does the 
king refer with 'give the child to her'? Disambiguation is clear on the basis of the script 
of jurisdiction: she who is right will be put in the right. 
A means of verifying the predicted isambiguations is offered by the availability of 
numerous translations of this story. In this section, a comparison is made between eleven 
English and Dutch translations from different imes and traditions. 
The majority of these translations can be characterized asmore or less idiolect, that 
is, each individual word and sentence is translated as literally as possible. The King 
James translation (KJ, 1611), the Jewish Publication Society translation (JPS, 1988), the 
Revised Standard Bible (RSB, 1952), the Dutch Statenvertaling (ST, 1637), and the 
Nederlands Bijbel Genootschap translation (NBG, 1951) are more strongly idiolect han 
the Revised English Bible (REB, 1989), the Dutch Leidsche translation (L, 1914), the 
Canisius translation (CAN, 1929), and the Willibrord translation (WlL, 1977); the latter 
four translations are modem, but still remain quite close to the original text. The Dutch 
Groot Nieuws [Great News] travslafion (GN, 1982) and Het Boek [The Book] (HB, 
1988), on the other hand, are dynamic-equivalent, that is, translations of discourse 
meaning as a whole into modem language, rather than literal translations of individual 
words or even sentences. 4 
All eleven translations were compared to the original text at the three potentially 
ambiguous points, A (v.23), B (v.26), and C (v.27), which resulted from the perspective 
domain analysis in the previous ection. 
A. Inner or spoken perspective of the king? (ad v.23) 
The idiolect translations (ST, KJ, JPS, RSB, L, NBG), as well as CAN and WIL 
adhere to the original text, which says the king speaks, but do not make explicit whether 
this speech is communicative or not, thus preserving the ambiguity. The dynamic-equiv- 
alent ones (GN, HB), as well as REB, explicitly present the situation as either 
4 An edition with six Dutch bible translations, including the Statenvertaling, Leidsche, NBG, and CAN, is 
provided by Boekenceutrum B.V. (1979). 
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communicative or non-communicative. HB opts for a communicative interpretation, i  
which the women are adressed irectly: Thus they went on quarreling in the presence of 
the king. Then king Solomon began to speak and said: "Let us put one and one 
together. Both of you say that the living child is yours and each of you says that the 
dead child belongs to the other. Right, bring me a sword." 5 By contrast, GN (as does 
REB) opts for a non-communicative nterpretation, i  which the king is thinking. GN: 
When they were thus quarreling before the king, he thought: "The one states: The living 
boy is mine, and the dead one is yours; the other one denies it and says: Not true, the 
dead boy is yours, and the living one is mine." Then the king began to speak: "Fetch a 
sword, t ,. 6 
Apart from the choice between 'speaking' and 'thinking', there are several differ- 
ences between the two translations. In the HB version, the spatial standpoint of the 
women's argument is neutral ('in the presence of the king'). As in the original text, the 
women's quarreling and the king's utterances are presented as separate acts, divided by 
a sentence boundary. The communicative act of speaking to the women leads to the 
inference that the king has chosen to confront the women with their contradictory 
statements. In the GN version, on the other hand, the women's arguments are presented 
as subordinate to the king's thoughts: it is possible that they are the cause of his thought 
(note that the temporal connective 'when' can have a causal reading). The translation of 
'thinking' reveals the inference of the king's contemplation with respect to the situation 
and possible solutions. Furthermore, GN presents the argument from the spatial vantage 
point of the king ('before the king' ). As a result, the perspective lies more firmly with 
the king and his (presumed) line of thought in the GN translation. The conclusion is that 
the 'modem' translations solve this ambiguity, and do so in dramatically different ways, 
which reveal different inferences as to the quality of the represented situation. 
B. Who is the real mother of the living child, the first or the second woman to speak? 
(ad v.26) 
All of the translations preserve this ambiguity, which confirms the idea that this 
particular ambiguity is crucial to the story's plot: it is the king's/reader's task to infer 
who is the mother of the living child. 
C. Who gets the child? (ad v.27) 
This ambiguity is solved in some of the translations. Of the idiolect ranslations, KJ, 
JPS, NBG, and CAN preserve the ambiguity, as does the dynamic equivalent translation 
5 Dutch original: En zo ruzieden zij maar door waar de koning bij was. Toen ham koning Salomo het woord 
en zei: "Laten we de zaken eens op een rijtje zetten: U zegt allebei dat het levende kind van u is en dat het 
dode kind aan de ander toebehoort. Goed, breng mij een zwaard." 
6 Dutch original: Toen ze zo voor de koning aan het bekvechten waren, overdacht hij: 'De een beweert: het 
levende jongetje is van mij, het dode van jou; de ander ontkent het en zegt: Niet waar. her dode jongetje is van 
jou, her levende van mij.' Toen ham de loaning het woord: "Haal een zwaard!' 
Likewise, REB also opts for a non-communicative nterpretation, i  which the king is thinking: 
So they went on arguing before the king. 
The king thought o himself, 'one of them says, "This is my chiM, the living one; yours is the dead one." 
The other says. "'No, it is your chiM that is dead and mine that is alive." ' Then he said, 'Fetch me a ,~vord.' 
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GN. In contrast, several idiolect translations disambiguate with different degrees of 
clarity. ST translates: Giveth the living child to that (as opposed to this); 7 WIL 
translates Give the living child to the first woman, s and the Leidsche translates: Give 
the boy to her who has said: give her the living child, and do not kill it: she is the 
mother. 9 Likewise, RVS and REB translate: Give the living child~baby to the first 
woman. The dynamic-equivalent translation HB states Do not kill the baby; give it to 
the woman who wants to let it live. l0 In other words, if the ambiguity in this passage is 
resolved, it results in the predicted interpretation, although the words that are used may 
differ. 
In conclusion, the analysis of the eleven translations shows that they treat the three 
ambiguities in different ways, depending on the type of ambiguity and its function in the 
story as they were found in the perspective domain analysis. The type of translation is, 
likewise, a factor: idiolect translations will be more reserved in their disambiguation 
choices. 
5. Exploring readers' disambiguation choices 
Translators obviously are not 'ordinary' readers. They read and write at the same 
time, keeping readers who will read their text in their mind. The question is whether 
ordinary readers would make those disambiguation choices in their representation as
predicted by the perspective domain analysis. Readers may represent the text in a less 
precise way, disambiguating at some points, while omitting other ambiguities altogether. 
Various research methods in the study of narrative comprehension, such as question- 
guided interpretation, reading aloud, and association, require that subjects rethink their 
interpretation in order to verbalize it. Such tasks may stimulate a meta-level of reflection 
that goes beyond normal comprehension. Readers may not be able to give such 
meta-evaluations. In order to minimize such problems as much as possible comprehen- 
sion can be studied irectly by having readers imply recall the story and, somewhat less 
directly, by elicitating readers' prediction of how the story will proceed using interrup- 
tion questions (see Feldman et al., 1990, for an extensive discussion of the matter). 
In a pilot experiment, these methods were used to explore readers' reactions to the 
story of Solomon's Judgment. It was investigated, whether eaders used the same 
disambiguation strategies as the translations did, i.e., according to the type and function 
of the ambiguity. 
5.1. Method 
First, the subjects' ability to represent perspectives was explored by comparing their 
recall of different perspective choices in the same situation. The availability of transla- 
7 Dutch original: Geeft het levende kind aan die (as opposed to deze). 
s Dutch original: Geefhet levende kind aan de eerste vrouw. 
9 Dutch original: Geeji het knaapje aan haar die gezegd heefl: geeft haar bet levende kind, en dood het niet: 
zij is de moeder. 
iv Dutch original: Dood de baby niet; geef hem aan de vrouw die hem in leven wil laten. 
J. Sanders~Poetics 24 (1996) 57-80 71 
tions with different perspective choices at point A (v.23) of Solomon's Judgment 
offered this opportunity. Two translations were chosen, the idiolect NBG translation 
with an ambiguous, communicative rsion ('the king said') of v.23, and the dynamic- 
equivalent GN translation with an explicitly non-communicative rsion ('the king 
thought') of v.23 (see previous ection). Ambiguities B and C were preserved in both 
translations. After they read the passage in which the king recalls what both women said 
(v.23), the subjects were asked to produce a first sentence to continue the story and to 
write a short summary of a possible follow-up. The instructions (on two separate pages) 
were: 
How do you expect he story will continue? 
Write down the first sentence by which the story proceeds. 
Give a summary in one or a few sentences of how the story could proceed and end. 
Then, the disambiguation strategies were investigated by studying whether subjects 
disambiguated the perspectival mbiguities in their recall as expected at points A (v.23), 
B (v.26), and C (v.27) in Solomon's Judgment. Subjects were presented the entire story 
which they (re-)read thoroughly from beginning to end. Mter 20 minutes of distraction 
by another, unrelated experiment, they were asked to write down in a coherent fashion 
what they recalled of the story. The instructions were: 
Try to recall the story you read in the first part of  this experimental session (that is, the 
complete, original version that you read last). 
YOU ARE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWED TO GO BACK AND READ 
THE STORY AGAIN. 
Now write down what you remember. Provide a coherent story in your own words. You 
can use the rest of  this page for this purpose. 
A frame, covering 75% of an A4 page, was given to suggest the requested length of the 
recalled story. 
The two translations were almost equally long (66 and 64 clauses, respectively). 
Some minor alterations had to be made in the older NBG version, because it used quite 
archaic and stylistically 'oldfashioned' Dutch at some points in comparison to the GN 
version. ~ The complete texts are presented in the appendix. 
Students of Tilburg University in various disciplines were invited to participate on 
payment of 10 Dutch guilders in a one-hour experiment. 40 students, who were unaware 
H In the NBG version, some verbs and pronouns were replaced by their modem equivalents like the ones 
used in the GN version: 'jij' you instead of 'gij' thou; 'jouw' your instead of 'uw' thy; 'zei' said instead of 
'zcide' saith; 'geef' give instead of 'geeft' give&, 'maar' but instead of 'doch' still; furthermore, quotation 
marks were added to direct quotes, as in the GN version. Owing to the difference in tradition of translation, 
some stylistic variances can be pointed out between the two translations. The idiolect NBG translation makes 
fewer concessions to the translation of individual words and constructions than the dynamic-equivalent GN 
translation, which aims at a'anslating the discourse meaning in general. Thus, the latter is less 'stiff', using 
sentences uch as Then the mother of the living child could not control her feelings any longer and said: '...', 
instead of the more literal version in the NBG version: Then the woman, whose the living child was, said to the 
king, because her motherly feelings for her son had been raised: '...'. 
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of the hypotheses, volunteered to participate. They were randomly assigned to two 
groups (N = 20, 10 male and 10 female). Members of each group read one of the two 
versions of the story. 
5.2. Results 
The subjects' answers to the two interruption questions were interpreted and analyzed 
by means of chi-square analyses. 12 It appeared that subjects represented the perspective 
they had read: subjects who read the GN version with the king's inner perspective more 
frequently continued the story by giving the king's inner thoughts or cognitive activity 
than subjects who read the NBG version, where the king speaks directly (NBG: 4 of 19 
versus GN: 13 of 20; K 2 = 7.65, df= 1, p < 0.01.) ,3 Likewise, subjects who read the 
NBG version without the king's inner perspective responded with fewer summaries 
which continued with the king's perspective than did subjects who read the GN version, 
although the numbers were too small to reach statistical significance (NBG: 5 of 12 
versus GN 7 of 12; K 2 = 0.66). ]4 
The protocols of subjects' recalls were subsequently interpreted with respect o the 
aspects relevant to disambiguation strategies: Was the king's perspective r presented as
uttered words or as inner thoughts (A)? Was unambiguous reference made to woman 1 
as the real mother or not (B)? Was unambiguous reference made to the real mother as 
the woman who gets the child or not (C)? The overall results were calculated and 
analyzed by means of chi-square analyses; in addition, comparisons were made between 
the two groups. 
A. Does the king speak or think when he repeats what the women said? (ad v.23) 
It appeared that subjects did not recall this element at all. Free recall permits ubjects 
to recall only those elements in the narrative that they choose, and thus to omit those 
they did not remember or did not consider important enough to recall. The king's words 
verbally repeat part of the previous utterances by the women; apparently, the subjects 
did not consider this repetition as a crucial event needed to provide a coherent 
representation f the story's plot. 
,2 In the pilot experiments reported in this paper, chi-squarc analyses are calculated for small values of N. 
For each analysis, it was checked whether one of the expected frequencies was under 5; in that case, Yates 
correction for continuity should be applied..However, this appeared not to be the case, except for one case 
which was far from significant. 
13 NBG version: 12 cases of king's direct speech, 3 cases of ambiguity between direct speech and direct 
thought, 1case of king's cognitive activity, and 3 cases of king's acts, vs. GN version: 2 cases of king's direct 
speech, 5 cases of king's direct thoughts, 8 cases of king's cognitive activity, and 5 cases of king's acts. The 
results were summarized as direct speech and acts on the one hand and direct thoughts and cognitive activity 
on the other, as presented in Table 1. In the analysis, the three cases in the NBG-version that were ambiguous 
between direct speech and direct thought were interpreted in the position that was most unfavonrable to the 
hypothesis, i.e., as direct thoughts. Note that in some of the following analyses, N is less than 20. In those 
cases, one or two of the subjects in a group did not provide an answer to the question at hand or did not 
represent the particular part of the discourse at hand. 
14 Only those subjects 02  in each group) were included in the analysis that afterwards indicated that they 
had not known the story before or had not recognized it until they had read the complete version. 
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B: Who is the mother of the living child, woman 1 or woman 2? (ad v.26) 
In contrast to the translations, which all preserve this ambiguity, a large minority of 
the subjects unambiguously referred to woman 1 as the mother of the living child. This 
was done by various means such as backward reference to woman 1 as the mother or 
explicitly pointing out woman 1 as the mother. Interestingly, a significant difference was 
found between the two translations: more subjects who read the NBG version referred to 
woman 1 as the mother of the living child than did readers of the GN version (NBG: 10 
of 20 versus GN: 2 of 20; K 2 = 7.62, df= 1, p < 0.01). In most cases, such reference 
was established by the fact that the subject chose to present he episode that was 
originally told by woman 1 (i.e., the episode of the two women at home and/or the 
death of the baby) as a part of the narrative reality. By omitting domain building 
elements which embed this episode as a story, each reference to the mother is 
unambiguously a reference to woman 1, as in the following translated protocol (3). 
(3) 
I. 
2. 
There were two women who had given birth to a child on the same day. 
Woman A rolled on the child during the night 
and then exchanged it for the child of woman B. 
3. When woman B woke up, 
she found out 
and they went to the king for advice. 
4. The king wanted to divide the child in two, 
one part for each. 
5. Woman A agreed with that, 
but woman B said: 
[domain/:"Give it to her, 
but please do not kill it"]. 
6. At that point the king decided 
that woman B should have the child, 
[domain 2: because she was], 
according to him, 
[domain 2: the real mother.] (...) 
The representation f this recalled protocol is different from the original representation 
presented in section 2. Here, it is not necessary to force a distinction between the women 
as woman 1 and woman 2, since the recalling subject him/herself explicitly calls the 
women A and B. In Fig. 6, the story of woman B is not explicitly embedded, but 
presented in the narrator's reality. Note that it is hard to tell from this protocol, as in the 
original story, whether the narrator thinks the king was wise or cruel in his demand to 
divide the child. It is also remarkable that the subject represents he king's demand by a 
volitional modal verb (want), thus presenting the king's thoughts or intentions from his 
implicit perspective (instead of presenting the king's utterances and acts as in original 
text). 
Thus, woman B is automatically identified as the mother of the living child, who was 
wronged and who needs the king to solve her problem. The king's attributed ilemma 
(who should get the child?) is no different from the representation f the original text, 
for he supposedly cannot see who the mother of the living child is and who is not. In 
this version of the story, the narrator and the reader know more than the king does. The 
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reality 
/ g was stolen from living baby by A \ 
/ B finds out ' ~  / andA and B go to king 
/ (kin g , .~  has to decid& 
[ ~ embedded thought I 
( di,,idot  obilO ) / 
= domain bui lder  
. . . .  ~ = inference 
Fig. 6. Perspective domain representation f s.1-4 
question which causes the suspense is whether the king will make the decision which the 
reader knows is right, and not what is the right decision. Thus, the king's decision to 
give woman B the child is still the right ending (Fig. 7), because he had to find out she 
was its mother. 
In their recall protocols, some subjects produced domain building elements that 
establish the attribution of the crucial episode to the woman who spoke first (woman 1), 
such as the information that this episode was a story, or was told; some subjects even 
summarized the embedding domain by stating 'it was unclear whose the dead baby 
was'. By con~ast, other subjects gave non-embedded representations of woman l 's 
story, sometimes even a chronologic, non-original structure, starting the story with what 
was originally woman 1 's perspective. 
Summarizing the results of all protocols, it appeared that significantly fewer subjects 
who had read the NBG version produced omain building indications than did subjects 
who had read the GN version; instead, subjects who had read the NBG version tended to 
give a non-embedded version of the first woman's story (NBG: 8 of 19 embedded 
versus GN: 17 of 20 embedded; K 2 = 7.79, dr= 1, p < 0.01). Note that a non-embedded 
version does not imply chronology: readers of the NBG version used the chronological 
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-~  = in fe rence  
Fig. 7. Perspective domain representation f s.5-6 
structure more often than did readers of the GN version, but not significantly so (NBG: 
9 of 19 chronological versus GN: 5 of 20 chronological; K 2 = 2.12, df= 1). Subjects 
who gave a non-embedded story could still opt for an original, non-chronological 
structure. An example: Two women, whores, come to the king. They had both given birth 
to a child, the one three days after the other. One of the two children had died because 
its mother had laid upon it (...). 
Ad C: Who gets the living child, woman a or woman b? 
While only some of the translations resolve this ambiguity, most subjects of both 
versions disambiguated in their recall that the real mother, woman a, got the child. 15 
Subjects howed their disambiguation in various ways, for instance, by explicit reference 
by the king to woman a as the one who gets the child: 'One of the women said: In that 
case give her the baby, let it live. The other woman said: Dead or alive, she will not 
15 33 of 40 subjects referred to the real mother (directly or indirectly) as the woman who gets the child 
(NBG: 16 of 20; GN: 17 of 20). 
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have the child. Then the king decided that the first woman was the real mother and he 
gave her the chiM'. Examples of other means are the omission of woman b's statement, 
in which case the king's reference is unambiguous, or the factive representation f the 
king's knowledge of motherhood: 'The king recognized the real mother and gave her 
the child'. 
5.3. Discussion 
In their recall, readers represented the story of Solomon's Judgment and the 
ambiguities in it in many more varied ways than the translations how. Yet, the 
strategies they used make sense in the light of the function the three ambiguities have in 
the story. 
What remains to be explained is why the two translations evoke such differences in 
disambiguation strategies at point B (v.26). It appeared that in contrast to readers of the 
GN version with the king non-communicatively 'thinking ', for the majority of subjects 
who read the NBG version with the king communicatively 'speaking', the story of 
woman 1 is no longer a story, but is 'factive', to be represented in the narrator's reality 
domain instead of an embedded omain attributed to this woman. The question is, of 
course, whether these different representations are caused by the perspectival difference 
at point A (v.23) between the translations. The explanation would then be that 
perspective choices cause particular attributions of intentions to the character with whom 
the reader identifies himself (Pollard-Gott, 1993), thus foregrounding different discourse 
patterns (Hoey, 1983; Culley, 1992). Identification with the king's inner perspective 
would evoke a problem-solution pattern for the king (to decide who is the mother of the 
living child), identification with the women's ituation would lead to a problem-solution 
pattern for the real mother (to persuade the king to give her the child). 
However, since the two translations differ in more aspects than the disambiguation 
with respect o the king's words or thoughts, it is possible that this perspective choice 
cannot fully explain the effects that were found. A control experiment was performed to 
test this possibility. The procedure was repeated with a new group of 20 subjects of 
Tilburg University. They read a new version in which the perspective choice of the 
dynamic-equivalent GN version was inserted into the idiolect NBG version (see 
appendix). It was expected that representations of the new version III, due to its 
perspective choice (representation f inner thoughts by the king), would be similar to 
those of the GN version and different from the NBG version. However, it was found that 
the subjects of version III did not significantly ess often identify woman 1 as the mother 
of the living child than did readers of the NBG version without inserted perspective 
(NBG: 10 of 20 versus III: 8 of 18; K 2 = 0.12, df= 1). With respect o the number of 
subjects who represented the episode as embedded, the results of the pilot and the 
control experiment are presented in Table 1. 
A small, non-significant increase of the number of subjects who represented the first 
woman's tory as an embedded story was found in version III in comparison to subjects 
who had read the NBG version (K 2 = 1.25, df= 1). In comparison to the GN version, 
version III resulted in considerably ess subjects whogave mbedded recall of the first 
woman's tory than did the GN version, though not significantly so (K 2 -- 3.13, df= 1). 
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Table 1 
Frequency ofresponses: I  the first woman's story presented as a story? 
77 
Version Embedded story Non-embedded story 
NBG (N = 19) 8 (42%) 11 (58%) 
GN (N= 20) 17 (85%) 3 (15%) 
III (N = 20) 12 (60%) 8 (40%) 
The results suggest hat the style of the two translations used in the reported 
experiments must also be taken into account as an explanatory factor for the effect that 
was found. Probably, the 'stiff' language in the NBG version made it easier for readers 
to identify with the very first character that comes along and stay with her, rather than 
giving any thought o new characters' viewpoints. Conversely, the modem language use 
in the dynamic-equivalent GN version makes it easier to adopt other characters' 
viewpoints. For instance, the second woman's reaction to the first woman's tory (v.22) 
is translated as a forceful 'Lies!' in the GN version, whereas the utterance 'Not true!' 
may be interpreted as weaker and thus less trustworthy. 
6. Conclusions 
Readers build mental models of the narrative discourse they read. In mental models, 
perspective domain structures are incorporated that make explicit who said and thought 
what. In addition, the domain structure represents causal inferences as to the intentions 
and attitudes of the narrator and protagonists. In constructing such representations, 
readers may arrive at different conclusions as to the precise domain structures. As a 
result, they will have different conclusions about what is 'true' in the narrator's narrative 
reality, and what is restricted to some character's perspectivized view of this reality. 
Ultimately, such differences may lead to various perceptions of what happened in the 
story. The analysis of the Solomon's Judgment narrative, which contains several 
ambiguous places, revealed the different representations that readers could construct. 
Pilot experiments suggest hat disambiguation is dependent on various factors, such as 
availability of contextual information i  favour of a particular interpretation, differences 
in discourse perspective choices in the text, and stylistic variations. These insights are 
particularly important for the study of biblical narratives. Biblical narrative, in compari- 
son to modem (fictional) narrative discourse, is extremely 'bald' in its reference to 
protagonists' emotions and intentions (Campbell, 1989). Translations that fill in the 
intentional gaps and update style may influence readers' interpretation considerably. 
Appendix: The original (Dutch) versions of the translations used in the pilots 
NBG version (corrected for archaic usages) 
Toentertijd kwamen twee vrouwen, hoeren, tot de koning en stelden zich voor hem. 
En de ene vrouw zei: "Met uw veriof, mijn beer, ik en deze vrouw wonen in ~n huis, 
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en ik heb bij haar in huis gebaard. Op de derde dag nadat ik gebaard had, heeft ook deze 
vrouw gebaard, en wij waren tezamen, er was geen vreemde bij ons in huis; alleen wij 
tweeEn waren in huis. Toen is de zoon van deze vrouw's nachts gestorven, doordat zij 
op hem gelegen had. En zij is te middernacht opgestaan en heeft mijn zoon naast mij 
weggenomen, terwijl uw dienstmaagd sliep, en heeft hem in haar schoot gelegd, en haar 
dode zoon heeft zij in mijn schoot gelegd. Toen ik 's  morgens opstond om mijn zoon te 
voeden, zie, hij was dood; maar ik gaf in de morgen acht op hem, en zie, het was niet de 
zoon, die ik gebaard had." Maar de andere vrouw zei: "Niet waar! de levende is mijn 
zoon, en de dode is jouw zoon. En deze zeide weer: Niet waar! de dode is jouw zoon en 
de levende is mijn zoon." Zo krakeelden zij in tegenwoordigheid van de koning. 
Toen zei de koning: "De ene zegt: 'Deze, de levende, is mijn zoon, en de dode is 
jouw zoon"; en de andere zegt: 'Niet waar! de dode is jouw zoon en de levende is mijn 
zoon.' " Daarop zei de koning: "Haal mij een zwaard." En zij brachten een zwaard bij 
de koning. En de koning zei: "Snijd het levende kind in tweeSn en geef de helft aan de 
ene en de helft aan de andere." Toen sprak de vrouw van wie het levende kind was, tot 
de koning, omdat haar moederlijk gevoel voor haar zoon was opgewekt; zij zei dan: 
"Met uw verlof mijn heer, geef haar het levende kind, maar dood het in geen geval." 
Maar de andere zei: "Het zal noch van mij noch van jou zijn, snijd door." Toen 
antwoordde de koning en zei: "Geef haar het levende kind en dood het in geen geval: 
zij is de moeder." 
Toen geheel IsraSl het oordeel vemam, dat de koning had uitgesproken, werden zij 
met ontzag voor de koning vervuld, want zij merkten, dat de wijsheid Gods in hem was 
om recht te doen. 
'Groot Nieuws' version 
Op een keer kwamen twee publieke vrouwen bij de koning hun opwachting maken. 
Toen ze voor hem stonden, nam een van hen het woord. 'Majesteit, ik vraag uw 
aandacht. Deze vrouw en ik wonen in hetzelfde huis en in dat huis heb ik pas een kind 
ter wereld gebracht. Zij was erbij. Drie dagen na mijn bevalling bracht ook zij een kind 
ter wereld; we waren samen thuis, we hadden geen vreemden op bezoek, alleen wij 
beiden waren in huis. Maar's nachts stierf haar kind; in haar slaap was zij er bovenop 
gaan liggen. Midden in de nacht, toen ik nog sliep, stond zij op, nam mijn zoontje bij 
mij weg en legde hem bij haar in bed; haar eigen zoontje legde zij bij mij neer. Toen ik 
's morgens opstond om mijn zoontje te voeden, ontdekte ik dat hij dood was. 's 
Ochtends bekeek ik hem nog eens goed en toen bleek dat het niet mijn zoontje was.' 
'Leugens!' riep de andere vrouw. 'Het levende jongetje is van mij, het dode van jou.' 
'Niet waar!' antwoordde de eerste. 'Het dode jongetje is van jou, het levende van mij.' 
Toen ze zo ooor de koning aan het bekvechten waren, overdacht hi j: 'De een 
beweert: Het levende jongetje is van mij, het dode oan jou; de ander ontkent het en zegt: 
Niet waar, het dode jongetje is oan jou, het levende van mij.' Toen nam de koning het 
woord: 'Haal een zwaard!' Toen ze hem een zwaard gebracht hadden, beval hij: 'Hak 
het levende kind in twee~n en geef beide vrouwen een helft!' Toen kon de moeder van 
het levende kind haar gevoelens niet meer de baas en smeekte: 'Alstublieft, majesteit, 
geef de levende baby aan haar, maar dood hem niet!' 'Niets ervan,' zei de andere 
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vrouw, 'hak hem maar door. Krijg ik hem niet, dan jij ook niet!' Toen deed de koning 
uitspraak: 'Geef haar de levende baby! Dood hem niet, zij is de moeder!' 
Toen de IsraSlieten hoorden wat voor vonnis de koning geveld had, kregen ze ontzag 
voor hem. Want ze zagen in dat God hem, om het recht te handhaven, met wijsheid had 
vervuld. 
Version I11 
NBG version with inserted perspective from 'Groot Nieuws' (see marked sentences). 
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